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The United States and India are enjoying increasingly close relations. This rep-
resents a transformation of the two countries’ past relationship, which was
characterized by suspicion and distrust. This change, which began with the
end of the Cold War, has resulted from a convergence of structural, domestic,
and individual leadership factors.
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Relations between the United States and India are at an
all-time high, with the two countries enjoying unprecedented levels of cooper-
ation in the economic, strategic, and diplomatic spheres. As President George
Bush recently put it, “India and the United States are separated by half a globe.




 In Prime Minister Man-
mohan Singh’s words, India and the U.S. “share the common goal of making
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of State Nicholas Burns predicts that “within a generation many Americans




However, Indo-U.S. relations have not always been so cozy. Indeed, the two
countries’ increasing closeness represents a major transformation of their past
relationship. Below, we describe the nature of Indo-U.S. relations from the
time of Indian independence through the end of the Cold War. As we explain,
although the countries shared a number of important interests and values, their
relationship was historically characterized more by suspicion and resentment
than by cooperation. We then show how a convergence of structural, domestic,
and individual leadership factors has transformed Indo-U.S. relations. At the
structural level, we argue that the end of the Cold War forced India to rethink
its attitude toward the U.S. while freeing the latter from the need to view India
through an anti-Soviet lens. At the domestic level, their country’s economic
failings made clear to Indian leaders that their socialist development model
was no longer tenable, spurring a raft of market-oriented reforms bringing
India closer to the U.S. At the individual level, Indian and American political
leaders took the difficult and sometimes risky political steps necessary to cre-
ate an environment in which an Indo-U.S. partnership could take root. To-





For most of the period after India achieved independence in 1947, the U.S.
viewed South Asia as a region largely peripheral to its central strategic needs.
This said, various American administrations did consider India to be a poten-
tially important front in the Cold War contest, viewing the country as a fledg-
ling democracy emerging in China’s communist shadow. They surmised that
India’s fate could have important implications for other Asian states struggling
to be free. To this end, the U.S. gave India substantial economic assistance,
particularly as the latter’s ties with China deteriorated. During the 1962 Sino-
Indian war, the U.S. publicly supported India’s interpretation of its border with




However, despite its potential importance and occasional periods of Indo-U.S.
cooperation, it was clear from early on that India would not serve as an active
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U.S. ally in the battle against global communism. For its part, India refused to
join either the American or the Soviet side in the Cold War conflict and instead




On one level U.S. policy makers sympathized with India’s position of “non-
alignment.” After all, India risked becoming a target of the opposing camp if it
openly took sides in the Cold War struggle. This was the reason that the U.S.
had been averse to joining military alliances for the first 150 years of its his-
tory. It was not surprising that India—a newly established and relatively weak




 From the U.S. perspective, the main problem
with Indian policy was that “non-alignment,” in practice, did not translate into
genuine neutrality. Instead, India tilted away from the U.S. and more into the
Soviet Union’s ambit, especially after the early 1970s.
India’s affinity for the Soviet Union was rooted both in subjective prefer-
ences and objective strategic factors. At the preferential level, Indians admired
the Soviet Union’s economic success. This also appealed to the socialist pro-
clivities of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and subsequent generations of
Indian elites, who deeply distrusted American-style free-market capitalism. In-
dians also believed that the Soviet Union would not become a colonial power
in the future because it lacked a colonial history; thus, it would not seek to ex-




At the strategic level, the Soviet Union afforded India crucial protection
against regional adversaries. In 1971 New Delhi and Moscow signed a treaty
of “peace, friendship, and cooperation” under which the two parties promised




 After that, India
came to rely on the Soviets to help protect it against the People’s Republic of
China, with which it had fought a bloody border war in 1962 and had an on-
going territorial dispute. During the early 1970s, China also began to enjoy
improved relations with the U.S., further exacerbating perceptions that Beijing
was a threat to India. The Soviets responded by bolstering their relationship
with India, providing sophisticated arms under highly favorable terms and
taking supportive positions in the U.N. Security Council, particularly over the
disputed territory of Kashmir.
In return India continued to support the Soviet Union on a variety of contro-
versial international issues. New Delhi withheld criticism of the Soviet invasion
 




 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2001), p. 271.
6. John Lewis Gaddis, 
 
Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National
Security Policy during the Cold War
 










 (Winter 2003/04), p. 41.
8. For a discussion of the politics surrounding the treaty, see Robert Horn, 
 
Soviet-Indian Rela-
tions: Issues and Influence
 




 http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/47/4/642/11885/as_2007_47_4_642.pdf by Indiana U
niversity Bloom








of Afghanistan in 1979, just as it had done with the Soviet invasion of Hun-
gary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. India also denied that the Eastern





foreign policy thus became a source of considerable irritation to the U.S. Not
only did the Indians refuse to assist the U.S. in containing Soviet power, but
they also actively cooperated with the Soviet Union in significant ways. In the
end, India was not useful in achieving America’s grand strategic goals and, in
fact, was perceived as actually helping the Soviets to undermine them.
Beyond these strategic problems, India was economically unattractive dur-
ing the Cold War. Given India’s chronic underdevelopment, the U.S. did not
view it as a potentially serious trading partner, target for investment, or source
of skilled labor. Thus, the U.S. could reap few economic benefits through en-
gagement with India. This economic weakness, in turn, severely constrained
India’s military capabilities and limited its ability to pose a direct threat to
American interests in South Asia, further reducing India’s relevance from a
U.S. standpoint. In essence, during the Cold War India refused to promote U.S.
grand strategic goals and offered few economic benefits, while posing little di-




Any strategic interest that the U.S. perceived in South Asia lay primarily
with India’s arch-rival, Pakistan. Pakistan, at least notionally, supported Ameri-
can grand strategic goals, including participating in anti-communist military
alliances such as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast




 Pakistan also allowed Washington to
use its territory as a base for overflights to eavesdrop on the Soviet Union, in
addition to serving as a vital conduit for American arms shipments to anti-
Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s. In return, the Pakistanis received




U.S. ties with Pakistan exacerbated Indo-U.S. estrangement, convincing the
Indians of America’s malign intentions. India objected to the U.S.-Pakistan re-
lationship on a number of levels. Most fundamentally, the Indians were an-
gered by the U.S. decision to favor small, dictatorial Pakistan over a major
democratic state such as India. Also, American support allowed the Pakistanis
 
9. Ganguly, “India’s Foreign Policy Grows Up,” p. 41.






The United States and India, 1947–
1964
 
 (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000).
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to adopt a confrontational approach, confident that their superior equipment,
training, and doctrine would enable them to wring concessions from the Indi-
ans and, if necessary, prevail in any military conflict. Such inflated Pakistani
confidence threatened Indian security and forced New Delhi to devote scarce
resources to increased defense spending. Finally, American aid helped to rein-
force the dominant position of the army in Pakistani politics, decreasing the
likelihood that Pakistan would make serious efforts to settle its differences with
India diplomatically. In the eyes of many Indians, America’s support for Paki-
stan reached its zenith during the 1971 Bangladesh war, when President Nixon





the Bay of Bengal. India viewed this move as a naked attempt to deter it from
taking further action against Pakistan. This incident continued to engage and
infuriate Indians for decades. The close relationship between the U.S. and Paki-
stan thus had an exceedingly negative impact on Indo-U.S. relations, convinc-





Finally, India and the U.S. spent several decades during the Cold War at
loggerheads over the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation. In the wake of In-
dia’s 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion,” the U.S. made South Asia a center-
piece of its non-proliferation efforts, in part by crafting legislation such as the
1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, the Pressler Amendment, and the Syming-





 Indians deeply resented this policy, which they viewed as discrim-
inatory and hypocritical. If nuclear deterrence worked for the West, Indians
reasoned, why should it be any less effective in South Asia? In 1998 then-





Thus, for most of the past six decades, relations between the U.S. and India
were frosty. Why then has their relationship changed so radically in recent
years? We argue that a confluence of structural, domestic, and individual lead-
ership factors has been responsible for this shift. At the structural level, the end
of the Cold War fundamentally altered India’s strategic calculus and broad-
ened U.S. foreign policy options. At the domestic level, India’s economic re-
forms made it an attractive business and trading partner. At the individual level,
political leaders broke with past policies in ways that helped change the trajec-
tory of Indo-U.S. relations. Below we address each of these issues in turn.
 




, pp. 273–74; Sumit Ganguly, “Deterrence Failure Revisited: The Indo-
Pakistani Conflict of 1965
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14. For details, see Devin T. Hagerty, 
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 (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1998), pp. 74–75,
82–83. Note that the Pressler Amendment was directed specifically at Pakistan.
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Few American interests were directly impacted in South Asia as the Cold War
came to a close. During the 1980s, the U.S. had been drawn into the region to
contest the expansion of Soviet power into Afghanistan. However, after the
Soviet defeat Washington ignored Afghanistan and virtually abandoned its erst-
while ally, Pakistan. In fact, the George H. W. Bush administration imposed
sanctions against Pakistan under the aegis of the Pressler Amendment in 1990,
saying it was unable to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explo-
sive device. Relations with India—despite occasional signs of improvement—
remained mired in differences over India’s nuclear weapons program as well




 The Indians, for their part, viewed
the U.S. as a quasi-colonial power, determined to deny India both its rightful





The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had profound
consequences for India’s foreign and security policies. As noted above, de-
spite its “non-aligned” status India had maintained a close relationship with
the Soviets. The collapse of the Soviet Union forced India’s policy makers to
recalculate their strategic options. No longer could they rely on their super-
power ally’s military and diplomatic protection. Nor, the Russians made clear,
would the Indians be able to continue purchasing arms under exceptionally
favorable Cold War terms. As a result, Indian officials began exploring other
possibilities. Slowly, they undertook measures to improve their relations with
China. More importantly, the Indians largely abandoned their reflexive op-
position to American strategic, economic, and diplomatic policies, evincing a
new openness to the pursuit of mutually beneficial endeavors. While determined
to avoid becoming a pawn in U.S. efforts to contain China, the Indians real-
ized that a closer relationship with the U.S. could help them fill the vacuum
left by the Soviet Union’s fall and also balance against rising Chinese power.
The U.S., for its part, was no longer forced to view India in light of the latter’s





 Thus, the massive structural shift that resulted from the end of
the Cold War foreclosed India’s old Soviet-centric strategic policies and drove
 
16. On the fitful improvement in Indo-U.S. relations, see Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, 
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it to consider an approach more amenable to cooperation with the U.S. The




Domestic-level factors also contributed to an Indo-U.S. rapprochement in the
post-Cold War era. The most important element was the severe financial crisis
that gripped India in 1991, after the first Gulf War. The convergence of three
distinct forces caused this crisis. First, India had badly depleted its foreign ex-
change reserves purchasing oil on the global spot market prior to the outbreak
of the war. Second, the hostilities forced India to repatriate, at short notice, over
100,000 expatriate workers from the Persian Gulf region. Their return closed
an important source of foreign exchange. Third, shortly after the war’s end, a
series of loan payments to multilateral banks came due. The combination of




Although its immediate cause was the Persian Gulf War, the roots of this fi-
nancial crisis lay much deeper in the structural weakness of the Indian econ-
omy. These, in turn, emanated from the failures of India’s socialist development
program. For decades, India had hewed to a course of industrial regulation,




 In the early 1990s, Prime Minister
Narasimha Rao and his finance minister, Manmohan Singh, faced a stark choice.
They could seek a short-term solution to India’s financial crisis through multi-
lateral loans, or they could try to address the deeper economic problems. Rao
and Singh opted for the second approach and decided to use the crisis to make
fundamental changes in India’s economic growth strategy. They abandoned,
for all practical purposes, India’s atavistic commitment to “import-substituting
industrialization” and the labyrinthine regulatory system that it had spawned.
Instead, they chose to move India toward more market friendly economic pol-
icies. Key aspects of this approach included adopting a structural adjustment
regime, reducing tariffs and agricultural subsidies, loosening industrial regula-




Since then India’s economic performance has improved dramatically. With
a gross domestic product (GDP) of over $4 trillion, the Indian economy is now




 Moreover, India’s GDP growth is no longer
stuck at the traditional “Hindu” rate of roughly 3%. Instead, GDP grew 5.6%
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in 1990 and 8.4% in 2005. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) predicts 2007
and 2008 GDP growth rates of 8% and 8.3%, respectively. India has also
emerged as a major player in the information technology sector and an impor-
tant international source of skilled labor. Its burgeoning middle class offers a
potentially vast market for foreign exports. Not surprisingly, Indo-U.S. trade





 Despite this progress, India continues to face serious economic chal-
lenges, particularly regarding inequality, education, infrastructure, and contin-
ued liberalization. As we explain below, these are potentially serious problems
that could undermine India’s economic progress—and the further expansion of
its relationship with the U.S. Nonetheless the new market-oriented approach
has helped to spur India’s economic growth. This has played a major role in
India’s rapprochement with the U.S. Both sides have much to gain from fur-




In addition to these structural and domestic factors, individual leadership has
also played a major role in facilitating enhanced Indo-U.S. ties. Various Indian
and American leaders have made significant contributions in this regard. For
instance, the decision by Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh to break with
India’s autarkic development strategy and begin moving toward market reforms
facilitated the growth that has made India such a valuable economic partner
for the U.S. Even though these market reforms were triggered by the economic
crisis emanating from the Gulf War, it still took considerable foresight and po-
litical courage for Rao and Singh to launch a policy that represented such a
major departure from the past. This is particularly true given the entrenched
interests within India that opposed any break with previous policy. For exam-
ple, both labor and management in the industrial sector strenuously opposed
the government’s efforts to undo restrictions on investment and expansion that
impeded the integration of Indian industry into the global economy. Elements
of the foreign policy bureaucracy also opposed economic and political mea-
sures that they saw as too closely aligned with the U.S. and the West. In addi-
tion, many commentators in the press and academe were severely critical of
India’s new direction. Efforts to implement the new economic policies have not
been uniformly successful and powerful industrial groups and labor unions con-




 Still, the changes in Indian economic policy
 
23. See ADB, “South Asia’s Growth to Remain Strong in 2007–2008, Says ADB” (March 27,


















. The pun “Hindu growth rate” plays on the
term “secular growth rate.” It was coined by noted Indian economist Raj Krishna.
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have been significant. Other leaders more cautious than Rao and Singh might
not have even attempted to introduce them.
U.S. President Bill Clinton’s leadership also played an important part in
facilitating Indo-U.S. rapprochement. The Clinton administration was com-
mitted to limiting the global spread of nuclear weapons; it imposed economic
sanctions to punish India and Pakistan in the wake of their 1998 nuclear tests.
This thoroughly vexed Indian leaders. However, in the Indians’ view, Clin-
ton’s actions during their country’s 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan largely
atoned for his earlier policy. Indeed, American actions during the Kargil con-
flict helped begin undoing the deep distrust of the U.S. that Indian leaders had
acquired over the previous several decades. To explain, India discovered in the
spring of 1999 that Pakistani forces had breached the Line of Control (LoC)
dividing Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir in a sector called Kargil.
The Pakistani positions enabled them to threaten Indian lines of communica-
tion into northern Kashmir. As a large-scale Indian counteroffensive began
to beat back the intruders, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif traveled to
Washington in July and asked Clinton to help him devise a solution to the con-
flict. Clinton refused to cooperate until all Pakistani forces had retreated back
to their side of the LoC. He also kept New Delhi informed of the progress of his
discussions with Sharif. The prime minister eventually agreed to Clinton’s terms




Clinton’s actions were significant because they demonstrated to India that
the U.S. was not blind to Pakistani malfeasance and that it would not necessar-
ily support its traditional ally at India’s expense. Indeed, under the right cir-
cumstances the U.S. was prepared to side with India even to the detriment of
Pakistan. This signaling to India was not simply an accident but rather a delib-




 In fact, it proved tremendously
important in demonstrating America’s good faith to the Indians, suggesting that
the two countries could work together as partners in the future. As Indian For-
eign Minister Jaswant Singh told Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in
the wake of the Kargil crisis, “Something terrible has happened these past sev-
eral months between us and our neighbors. But something quite new and good
has happened . . . between our countries, yours and mine—something related




Another example of individual leadership’s role in facilitating improved
Indo-U.S. relations is the George W. Bush administration’s 2005 decision to
 
25. For inside accounts of Clinton’s decision-making during the Kargil crisis, see Bruce Rei-
del, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Center for Advanced
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pursue a nuclear energy deal with India. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) offers assistance with civilian nuclear programs only to states that join
the treaty as non-nuclear powers. U.S. law and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
guidelines forbid the sharing of nuclear fuel and technology with countries
classified as “non-nuclear weapons states” under the NPT, unless those states
accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Thus,
India—which neither acceded to the NPT nor accepted IAEA safeguards—
had been ineligible for civilian nuclear assistance under the NPT, U.S. law,
and NSG guidelines. Nonetheless, the Bush administration announced in July
2005 that it planned to offer India fuel and technical support for its civilian nu-
clear program under specific conditions. Officials demanded that India sepa-
rate its civilian and military programs, allow inspections of its civilian program,
effectively secure its nuclear materials and technologies in order to prevent
their proliferation, continue its moratorium on nuclear testing, and participate




The proposed Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has spurred a contentious debate. Critics
argue that the agreement would badly undermine the NPT by rewarding India
with nuclear assistance despite its refusal to sign the treaty, and would en-
courage other nuclear supplier countries to provide nuclear technologies and
materials to potential proliferators. By allowing India access to a ready inter-
national supply of civilian nuclear fuel, the deal could enable the Indians to
use their scarce indigenous uranium supplies to expand their nuclear weapons
arsenal. This could lead to Pakistani and Chinese balancing behavior, possibly
destabilizing South Asia. Proponents of the deal argue that it actually strength-





regime rather than keeping it isolated. In addition, the advocates argue that the
deal would help reduce India’s reliance on fossil fuels by increasing its access
to clean energy sources and would recognize India’s growing international stat-
ure and history of responsible nuclear stewardship, thus removing an impor-




Regardless of one’s views on the desirability of the proposed agreement,
two things seem clear. First, the nuclear deal, to a large degree, resulted from
 
28. For a detailed discussion of the terms of the agreement, see Fred McGoldrick, Harold Ben-





35:8 (2005), pp. 6–12.
29. This brief discussion does not purport fully to capture the arguments of the deal’s propo-
nents or detractors. For detailed analysis, see Ashton B. Carter, 
 
The India Deal: Looking at the Big
Picture
 
 (testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate), November
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President Bush’s personal leadership. As critics of the deal point out, the pro-
posed accord did not emerge from a protracted process of interagency policy
formulation but rather from a very small group within the administration, in-
cluding Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Burns, counselor Philip Zelikow, and President Bush himself. These leaders “had
[apparently] made up their minds to lead a bold departure from long-standing
policies toward India and toward U.S. and international rules governing nu-
clear technology commerce.”30 The plan was subjected to minimal interagency
and congressional review; Bush and Manmohan Singh announced it as a sur-
prise during the prime minister’s July 2005 visit to Washington. Thus, presi-
dential leadership was crucial to the formulation of the proposed U.S.-India
nuclear agreement. It is questionable that a different administration—with a
president less committed to a thorough transformation of Indo-U.S. relations—
would ever have offered such a deal.
Second, there is little doubt that the proposed nuclear agreement has played
an important role in facilitating the recent Indo-U.S. rapprochement. As noted
above, Indian leaders bitterly resented American efforts to keep India from ac-
quiring nuclear weapons, and American punishment once it had done so. In-
deed, the Indians viewed the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime as being
deeply flawed. They believed that the regime perpetuated a world of inequality
in which the existing nuclear powers enjoyed the benefits emanating from their
possession of these ultimate weapons, while other states were forced to accept
second-class status. This double standard was particularly offensive in light of
India’s colonial past. The Indians also perceived that the non-proliferation re-
gime ignored legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear states. Many non-
nuclear countries are located in extremely dangerous regions; these states can
potentially benefit from nuclear weapons’ deterrent effects. Thus, in the Indian
view, the nuclear non-proliferation regime was both philosophically and strate-
gically unsound.31 As former Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh argued,
If the permanent five continue to employ nuclear weapons as an international cur-
rency of force and power, why should India voluntarily devalue its own state power
and national security? Why admonish India . . . for not falling in line behind a new
international agenda of discriminatory nonproliferation. . . . Nuclear weapons powers
continue to have, but preach to the have-nots to have even less.32
Indian leaders’ resentment over America’s nonproliferation policy broadly
tainted the Indo-U.S. relationship, impeding cooperation even in areas wholly
30. Perkovich, “Faulty Promises.”
31. S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South
Asia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007).
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unrelated to nuclear weapons.33 Now, however, the U.S. has radically altered
its position, announcing a willingness to change both its domestic laws and in-
ternational regulations in order to provide India with civil nuclear assistance.
In doing so, the U.S. has evinced a commitment not only to support India’s
continued economic progress but also to recognize it as a de facto nuclear
weapons state. Therefore, as Ashley Tellis argues, the nuclear deal “symbol-
izes, first and foremost, a renewed American commitment to assisting India
[to] meet its enormous developmental goals and thereby take its place in the
community of nations as a true great power.” The deal thus “becomes the vehi-
cle by which the Indian people are reassured that the United States is a true
friend and ally responsive to their deepest aspirations.34 By clearly ending
the past several decades of nuclear “apartheid,” the proposed civilian nuclear
agreement has helped to fundamentally change the tenor of Indo-U.S. rela-
tions and promises to open new potential avenues of cooperation.
Prospects for the Future
What does the future hold for the relationship between the U.S. and India? Al-
though bilateral relations appear to be extremely promising at the moment, a
number of difficulties could slow or derail continued progress. One problem is
that the proposed Indo-U.S. nuclear pact could fail. Indian officials insist that
the agreement must allow them to test nuclear weapons and to reprocess spent
nuclear fuel. The Americans have thus far refused to agree to the Indians’
terms.35 If these differences prevent the nuclear deal from being realized, much
of the goodwill that it has generated could evaporate.
Another potential problem is that American leaders may behave as if their
willingness to cooperate has bought them India’s allegiance. Some American
policy makers believe that in return for the proposed nuclear agreement, India
is obliged to support U.S. global nonproliferation efforts. As Congressman
Tom Lantos put it, “There is quid pro quo in international relations. And if our
Indian friends are interested in receiving all of the benefits of U.S. support, we
have every right to expect that India will reciprocate in taking into account our
concerns.”36 Many Indians resent this view, believing that the price of coop-
eration with the U.S. should not be Indian acceptance of American foreign
33. Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Brian Shoup, eds. Indo-U.S. Strategic Cooperation
into the Twenty-First Century: More Than Words (London: Routledge, 2006).
34. Ashley J. Tellis, “U.S.-India Atomic Cooperation: Strategic and Nonproliferation Implica-
tions,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 26, 2006.
35. See Somini Sengupta, “India Debates Its Right to Nuclear Testing,” New York Times, April
21, 2007; Jo Johnson, “Bush Keen to Secure India Nuclear Deal,” Financial Times, May 17, 2007.
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policy goals.37 A similar situation could emerge regarding U.S. policy toward
China. The Bush administration hopes that greater Indian economic and mili-
tary prowess will offer a useful hedge against expanding Chinese power. In-
dia, for its part, also has reason to fear increased Chinese capabilities and
ambitions. Nonetheless, India will formulate its China policy primarily from
the standpoint of Indian interests. As a result, U.S. and Indian objectives vis-à-
vis China may not always be compatible. If the U.S. assumes that they must be
so, this could lead to discord over the long term.38
Another possible stumbling block is the Indian economy. Despite its impres-
sive recent performance, significant weaknesses remain in a number of impor-
tant areas that could impede continued economic growth. For example, India
continues to suffer from massive inequality. Its economic boom has largely
been an urban phenomenon, with much of the countryside—which accounts
for roughly 70% of the population—having been left out. Indeed, approximately
50% of rural India still lacks access to electricity.39 The Indian government es-
timates that over one-fifth of the population lives in poverty. And 46% of In-
dian children suffer from malnutrition, in comparison to 35% in sub-Saharan
Africa and only 8% in China.40
India’s public education system, furthermore, is in shambles. About one-third
of children fail to complete five years of primary school and roughly the same
proportion of the population is illiterate.41 Another challenge to continued eco-
nomic growth lies in India’s dilapidated physical infrastructure, which is in
desperate need of large-scale investment. Experts estimate that, in order to sus-
tain robust economic expansion, the government must spend approximately five
times the $30 billion it has currently earmarked for yearly infrastructure ex-
penditure. This lack of solid infrastructure, including transportation facili-
ties, has negatively affected India’s agricultural sector, which loses between
30% and 40% of its produce to waste. Agricultural growth, in fact, shrank from
6% to 2.7% during 2006–07. Additionally, despite economic liberalization,
37. For example, see, Prakash Karat, “Betrayal on Iran: Costs of India-U.S. Partnership,” In-
dian Express, September 30, 2005.
38. Perkovich, “Faulty Promises.”
39. Adil Zainulbhai, “Equitable Growth Not Just a Dream,” Financial Times (Asia Edition),
November 29, 2006.
40. Government of India, “Economic Survey 2006–2007,” available at http://indiabudget.
nic.in/es2006-07/esmain.htm; Jeremy Page, “India’s Economy Fails to Benefit Children,” The
Times (London), February 22, 2007. The Indian government bases its poverty estimates on data
from state and sector-specific household surveys and price indexes. For a detailed discussion of
this methodology, see Angus Deaton and Valerie Kozel, “Data and Dogma: The Great Indian Pov-
erty Debate,” World Bank Research Observer 20:2 (Fall 2005).
41. Guy de Jonquieres, “Just Rolling Back India’s State Is Not Enough,” Financial Times, Feb-
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the country remains hidebound by regulation. The World Bank in 2006 ranked
the ease of doing business in India at 134 out of 175 countries in the world.42
Thus, continued economic expansion is not a foregone conclusion. India’s eco-
nomic growth could stall if it fails to feed and educate its people, neglects to
build and maintain the ports and roads necessary for easy movement of goods
and services, and/or impedes wealth creation through punitive regulations. This
would make India a much less attractive strategic partner for the U.S. and
would remove one of the main factors driving the current rapprochement.
Finally, continued conflict with Pakistan could impede further progress in
the Indo-U.S. relationship. Indo-Pakistani discord is rooted in the two coun-
tries’ dispute over the territory of Kashmir, which has been divided between
them since 1948 and which both sides claim wholly. India and Pakistan have
fought three wars over the territory, and Indian-controlled Kashmir has been
wracked by a Pakistan-supported insurgency since the late 1980s. The Kash-
mir conflict has proved extremely costly for India, killing significant numbers
of Indian security forces and diverting considerable military and economic re-
sources from other uses. The conflict has severely tarnished India’s interna-
tional reputation, largely because New Delhi’s efforts to combat the Kashmiri
insurgents have led to large-scale human rights violations.43
Costs such as these could impede the future progress of Indo-U.S. relations.
They threaten to divert resources needed for continued economic develop-
ment, distract policy makers’ attention from managing India’s emergence in
the larger global arena, and damage the country’s image.44 The conflict could
also trigger an outright Indo-Pakistani confrontation, putting India in the awk-
ward position of fighting with a key U.S. ally. Fortunately, the Kashmir con-
flict appears to be ebbing in the face of increasing Indian conventional military
capacity, American pressure on Pakistan to rein in the insurgency, Pakistan’s
preoccupation with its own sectarian problems, and India’s willingness to ne-
gotiate directly with separatist groups. If India and Pakistan ultimately do
manage to resolve the dispute, it will enable India to avoid the risks discussed
above and remove a potential stumbling block to continued progress in its ties
with the U.S.
42. Johnson, “Where All Is Not Yet Equal India”; “Rs 50,000 Crore Worth Farm Produce Go-
ing Waste Every Year,” The Hindu, June 20, 2005; Shalini S. Dagar, “The Missing Chain,” Busi-
ness Today, May 20, 2007; Government of India, “Economic Survey 2006–2007.” In addition to
supply-chain problems, other causes of India’s steep decline in agricultural growth include poor
fertilizer use, low seed replacement rates, and low investment levels. See Government of India,
“Economic Survey 2006–2007.”
43. See Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent. On the sources of the Kashmir insurgency, see Ganguly,
The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997).
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It is difficult to conclusively predict whether any of these problems will
substantially impede further improvement of the Indo-U.S. relationship. How-
ever, at present the signs appear to be hopeful overall. In the nuclear arena,
both Prime Minister Singh and President Bush have invested considerable po-
litical capital in the proposed nuclear deal and will be loathe to see it fail.
Therefore, there are strong incentives for the two sides to overcome their dif-
ferences. If they are unable to do so, any resulting short-term damage to the
relationship is likely to be outweighed by long-term synergies between U.S.
and Indian interests. In the diplomatic sphere, even though American officials
have touted the growing bilateral partnership, they have also taken great pains
to acknowledge India’s independent international stature and policy autonomy.
American leaders thus seem unlikely to make the mistake of confusing India’s
friendship with servitude. On the economic front, most analyses call for con-
tinued robust Indian economic growth for the foreseeable future, despite the
problems discussed earlier. This continued expansion may give policy makers
a window of opportunity to address looming challenges before they become
too much of a drag on the economy.
Perhaps the least predictable challenge to improved ties is India’s relation-
ship with Pakistan. As noted above, the situation in Kashmir has improved
considerably. Insurgent violence and cross-border infiltration have declined;
the Indo-Pakistani peace process continues to work toward achieving a mutu-
ally agreeable settlement to the dispute. However, the situation in Kashmir is
fluid. Pakistan helped create and support the jihadi organizations seeking to
oust India from Kashmir. Were they to launch a major attack in Kashmir or in
India proper, New Delhi could be pressed to take a hard line against Pakistan
irrespective of any direct involvement by Islamabad. Alternatively, a major do-
mestic upheaval in Pakistan—such as the overthrow of the current regime by
radical elements—could threaten India. This would put the two back in an ad-
versarial role, possibly to the detriment of India’s larger strategic aspirations—
such as continued improvement in ties with the U.S. But such events could
also bring India and the U.S. closer together, reinforcing for both sides the
commonality of their long-term strategic interests to contain a potentially dan-
gerous situation. Even in the worst-case scenario, it will be difficult to com-
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